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Introduction
With increasing frequency, we hear concerns that most of the population will enter
retirement with inadequate resources.  Worries abound about the stability of each leg of the three
legged stool supporting consumption in retirement: spotty and inadequate pension coverage, an
unstable social security system, and low accumulation of nonannuity wealth by most families.  
Concern about the adequacy of retirement savings has motivated a number of public policy
initiatives, including tax policies encouraging the expansion of IRAs, increased efforts to educate
the public about the need for retirement savings, active exploration of proposals to privatize at
least a portion of social security, and other policy initiatives designed to encourage increased
savings for retirement.  We also have witnessed the adoption of simplified pensions, continuing
efforts to spur pensions through tax subsidies, sporadic relaxation of some pension regulations,
and other policy initiatives that are designed to increase pension wealth in retirement.  
With the approaching retirement of the baby boom generation, we clearly need good
information on the resources available to those on the verge of retirement.  Further, we need a
better understanding of the behavior underlying wealth accumulation.  With this information, we
can improve our understanding of models of savings, and provide a clearer guide as to the likely
effects of tax policies aimed at encouraging retirement savings.
This paper will focus on a number of key questions regarding the components of
retirement savings, the relation among these components and the adequacy of retirement savings,
for a cohort of Americans born from 1931 through 1941 who now are on the verge of retiring.
What fraction of households (rather than individuals) are covered by pensions? What do pensions
from current and past jobs contribute to the retirement savings of families who are approaching2
retirement age?  What is the value lost by pension covered workers leaving their jobs?  Was social
security a good deal for families in this cohort?  How much wealth are HRS households
accumulating as they approach retirement? Does wealth vary importantly with lifetime earnings? 
Are family resources adequate to support a reasonable standard of living in retirement?  Are those
with pensions better prepared for retirement?  Are those without pensions saving adequately for
retirement?  Is there a crisis in retirement savings?  Is there a great deal of substitution between
pensions and other components of retirement savings?
The effects of policies aimed at increasing retirement savings, including pension policies,
tax policies and efforts to introduce privatized social security accounts, depend on behaviors that
still are not well understood.  If expansion of subsidized retirement vehicles merely shrinks
savings in other forms, then these policies will not be effective.  If the public is poorly informed
about the need for retirement savings, then exposure to pensions and other retirement vehicles
will increase savings.  Indeed, privatizing social security, by exposing many in the population to a
retirement account with an easily understood balance, could conceivably have a much larger effect
on savings than would be predicted from a simple life cycle behavioral model dominated by
substitution.  On the other hand, if private pensions are already widely available to those on the
verge of retirement, then the public may be sufficiently well informed about the need for
retirement savings, and well protected from their pensions, social security and other savings, that
observed balances may reflect preferences, rather than a failure to save due to ignorance.
Clearly, it is crucial to determine the facts.  Most importantly, we would like to know
about preparation for retirement by those who are just about to retire.  This paper uses unique
data in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to provide estimates of the value of pensions and3
social security before the sampled individual is old enough to receive these benefits.  Estimates of
pension value are obtained from employer provided pension plan descriptions.  Estimates of social
security wealth and of lifetime earnings are based on earnings records provided by the Social
Security Administration.  Estimates of other sources of wealth are obtained from a detailed and
innovative household survey.  
We find that pension coverage is more widespread among families than advertised, and for
this cohort, cashing out of pensions is not a major problem.  Although on average social security
is a losing investment for those in the HRS cohort, social security and pensions are equally
important sources of retirement income, together accounting for half of retirement wealth.
Because social security is heavily progressive, providing very high replacement rates for
low earners, while pension wealth is most important to those in the twenty fifth to ninety fifth
earnings percentiles, it is not obvious just from information on the distribution of nonpension,
nonsocial security wealth how preparation for retirement varies with the level of lifetime earnings. 
This motivates an analysis of the variation of total wealth with lifetime earnings.  
We construct a comprehensive measure of retirement wealth, permitting us to judge the
extent to which the cohort now approaching retirement age is prepared for retirement.  Our
analysis suggests that the assets accumulated by this cohort by the time they reach their mid-fifties
appear adequate to replace the average incomes enjoyed by most HRS respondents throughout
their lifetimes.  Although an important segment of the population will experience a serious decline
in the living standard, as long as the government delivers on promised social security benefits,
most in this cohort are well on their way to financing an adequate retirement experience.  This
raises questions about the extent of the retirement savings problem, at least for members of the4
cohort now on the verge of retirement. 
Our findings provide evidence of interest to students of savings behavior.  Consistent with
a simple life cycle model with homothetic preferences, in descriptive statistics we find that the
relation of total wealth accumulation to lifetime earnings is relatively constant over most of the
lifetime earnings distribution.  However, once we control for correlates of pension coverage or
plan value in a multivariate setting, we find that pensions displace only a fraction of other savings,
or that there is no displacement at all.  This result raises questions about a simple life cycle
interpretation of savings.  It also raises questions about the idea that pensions are primarily
demanded because they allow saving through a tax favored, rather than taxable vehicle.  If
pensions do not replace other forms of savings, so that total wealth accumulation is higher for
pension covered workers, then policies that encourage pensions also will improve the adequacy of
income support in retirement.  
Accordingly, while our findings suggest that at least for the cohort now on the verge of
retirement wealth accumulation appears adequate for many, they also suggest that policies that
encourage pension coverage will increase total retirement wealth.  
Our analysis relies on a series of reduced form equations, trying a number of specifications
to judge the sensitivity of the relation of pensions to savings.  The strength of relying on a reduced
form approach is that we do not impose a behavioral structure, such as the life cycle model, when
there is so much disagreement and confusion as to the relative importance of competing behaviors
in explaining savings.  The weakness is that without a clear structural model that conforms closely
to behavior, we cannot isolate the key behavioral parameters that would be most useful for
predicting the effects of alternative policies.  Our ultimate aim is to build on the information1Researchers have questioned the Social Security Actuaries' assumptions on life
expectancy (e.g., see Lee and Skinner, 1996).  Longer life expectancy will improve the estimated
returns to social security indicated below.
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presented here to develop a dynamic, stochastic, structural model of retirement and savings, and
to use that model to analyze the effects of pension, social security and related retirement and tax
policies on behavioral outcomes.  Throughout the analysis we adopt assumptions about life
expectancy and the course of interest rates and wage growth that accord with the assumptions
made in the intermediate projections by the Social Security Actuaries.  Although some of these
assumptions have been questioned, and some of our findings are sensitive to these assumptions,
they seem like a good starting point for the analysis.
1
Pensions, Social Security, Private Wealth and Lifetime Earnings
The Health and Retirement Study
The data used in this study are unique and ideally suited for analyzing total wealth
accumulation and the role of pensions in retirement savings; they are worthy of special mention at
the outset of the analysis.  The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a nationally representative
survey of over 7,600 families who have at least one member born from 1931 to 1941.  These data
include highly detailed, employer provided plan descriptions for the pensions covering many
workers in the sample.  This allows much more accurate estimation of pension values than is
possible with self reported pension data (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1989).  Another major
advantage of the HRS is that social security records are available for 70 percent of the sample,
and are augmented by detailed information on work history.  This allows accurate estimation of
lifetime earnings for each individual, and avoids the potential underestimate of  social security
wealth when self reported data are used (Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick and Steinmeier,2HRS respondents who reported that they had a pension in their current job were asked
the name and address of their employer.  The survey staff of the Institute for Social Research
(ISR) then contacted these employers to try to obtain pension plan Summary Plan Descriptions
(which are publicly available documents).  In cases where that did not work, a backup plan was
used whereby the records at the Department of Labor were searched for the Summary Plan
Descriptions.  Of the 5,713 HRS respondents who indicated they were covered by a pension, this
strategy resulted in plan descriptions being gathered for 3,834 individuals, or about 67% of those
who indicated that they were covered.  A program to evaluate these pensions under various sets
of assumptions has been developed at ISR, and is being adapted for use on personal computers. 
Because the program is not complete at the time of writing, this paper uses a program for
evaluating pensions developed by Gustman and Steinmeier (1989, 1998).  
3For example, if a person is 57, will qualify for early retirement at 62, and has been with
the firm for 15 years, three quarters of the pension wealth that will eventually be accumulated will
have been accumulated based on work to date.  The calculation discounts for both the interest
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forthcoming; Mitchell, Olson and Steinmeier, 1996).  HRS respondents also provide
comprehensive information about assets other than pensions and social security.  The survey
instrument deals uniquely with what are typically high rates of nonresponse or refusal when a
respondent is asked about the value of stock holdings, IRA balances or amounts found in other
narrow asset categories.  Whenever an open ended  question about the value of an asset is not
answered, the question is followed with a series of bracketed questions.  This approach greatly
reduces item nonresponse and results in increased reporting of wealth (Moon and Juster, 1995;
Smith, 1995).  
Estimation of Pension Values From Employer Provided Pension Plan Descriptions
For defined benefit (DB) plans, which determine yearly benefits in retirement based on a
formula, the employer-provided pension plan descriptions collected by the HRS make it possible
to calculate benefit amounts relatively accurately.
2  The wealth value of the pension is simply the
discounted value of these benefits, prorated on the basis of work to date as a share of work from
date of hire until eligibility for early retirement benefits.
3  Thus accumulated pension wealth, andrate and for the survival probability.
4In the case of old plans, that is plans from previous jobs, we count an individual as
covered by a pension where the individual indicates that he or she was included in the pension. 
When we calculate the current value of pension wealth, we exclude those who indicate they
received a cash settlement when they left, or lost their benefits.  When we calculate the total value
of pensions earned, rather than the present value of wealth, we include older plans that have been
cashed out or disposed of in other ways.  We also note the disposition of old plans.
5Gustman and Steinmeier (1985) find that once adjustments are made for the changing mix
of part-time and full-time work and for selection into retirement, real wage offers do not decline
with age.
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all other wealth figures reported, are the accrued values as of 1992.
For defined contribution (DC) plans, which accumulate assets in an account held in the
worker's name, we also use the employer-provided pension formula to estimate the value of the
pension.  The total attributed to the defined contribution plan is the sum of employer contributions
plus mandatory contributions made by the individual.  When there are voluntary contributions, as
in Samwick and Skinner (1995), the amounts in the defined contribution plans assume that
individuals contribute up to a maximum of 5 percent whether or not there is matching.  That is on
top of any mandatory contribution.
4  
In computing pension wealth for those who are currently covered by a pension, we
benchmark the benefit based on the worker's current annual earnings.  We assume that in the
future, the wages of each of these covered individuals increase with the overall growth of wages. 
However, given the respondent's age, we do not add any premium for increasing tenure.
5  
For purposes of projecting pension benefits, we assume inflation at 4 percent, 5 percent
nominal wage growth, and 6.3 percent nominal interest rate, the steady state intermediate6This steady state interest rate is below the average interest rate projected by the Trustees
for tax and benefit payments made after 1992 (Annual Report of Board of Trustees, 1995, Table
II.D1, intermediate assumptions, p. 56).  The interest rate projected by the Trustees starts at 7.1
percent (4.2 percent real) in 1992, falls to 2.5 percent real by 2004, and to a steady state real rate
of just below 2.3 percent real in 2009.  Neither our program for evaluating employer provided
pension plan descriptions, nor the HRS pension program, currently allows the interest rate for
discounting pension values to vary over time.  As will be seen below, when the higher interest
rates are used to discount social security benefits, rather than the steady 2.3 percent rate, the
present value of benefits is reduced by about 15 percent.
7In Gustman and Steinmeier (1998) we compare the returns to social security under the
1990 life table and a life table where mortality rates are adjusted for trends in mortality, income
differences and race.  We have not used the adjusted mortality rates in the present paper because
we want the estimates of pension wealth and social security wealth presented here to be consistent
with SSA assumptions.
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assumptions adopted by the Social Security Administration (Board of Trustees, 1995).
6  Thus real
wage growth is 1 percent (actually 1.05/1.04 = 0.96 percent), and the real interest rate is 2.3%
(actually 1.063/1.04 = 2.2 percent), which also is the return assumed on assets invested in DC
plans.  Life expectancy is based on a projected life table used by the Social Security actuaries to
analyze the funding status of social security under the intermediate funding assumptions (see
Mitchell, Olson and Steinmeier, 1996).
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Because pensions are employment based, the pension literature and popular press
commonly focus on the distribution of pensions among individuals rather than households.  As of
1992, half of all individuals aged 51 to 61 currently have the rights to a pension from a current or
previous job (bottom row of the first panel of Table 1, third column).  In 1992, among all HRS
individuals, still active claims on pensions from current and previous jobs altogether have an
average value per individual in the sample of $74,461.  Among those individuals with a claim on
pensions, their pensions have an average value of $148,884, with benefits of $78,892 for the
median individual.  8The categories of current job, last job and previous job correspond with sections F, G and
H of the wave 1 questionnaire of the Health and Retirement Study.  There, a person who had a
current job was asked about that job, about the most recent previous job lasting at least 5 years,
and about all other previous jobs in which there was a pension.  A person who was not currently
employed was asked first about the last job held, and then about the previous 5 year job, then
about all other pension jobs.  Therefore, while current and last job categories are mutually
exclusive, the previous job category overlaps with current or last job, and the sum of the
percentages of individuals or households with a pension from a current job, last job and previous
job exceeds the total fraction of individuals or households who have a pension.
9The ratios indicating the importance of current, last and previous pensions for individuals
differ slightly from the comparable ratios for families.  The family data includes imputed pension
and other wealth for 284 spouses who did not respond to the survey.
9
When discussing pensions as a source of retirement wealth to be combined with other
wealth, the household perspective is most useful.  Moreover, the household data tell a different
story from the individual data.  As of 1992, two thirds of all households with at least one member
who is 51 to 61 years old still own the rights to a pension from a current or previous job (bottom
row, third column of the second panel of Table 1).
8  Among all households, the average value of
current claims on pensions from current or past jobs is $124,991, with mean and median values of
$190,621 and $112,499 among households with pensions.
Because the HRS population is old enough for some already to have retired, and for
others to have left the main job held for many years, it is not surprising that only 58 percent of
pension wealth is due to the current job.  Among all individuals and households, 18 percent
(13,474/74,461, and 22,779/124,991) of pension wealth comes from pensions on last jobs held by
those with no current job, and 24 percent of pension values (17,537/74,291, and 29,434/124,991)
come from pensions held on previous jobs.
9  
Table 2 disaggregates these observations by gender and family status.  The sharpest
contrast is between the figures for households and individuals.  As of 1992, three fourths of10These findings are consistent with Iams (1992).  Using SIPP data, Iams (1995) found
that during 1993, 75 percent of married households aged 40 to 54 had a pension.  Iam's results
suggest that there was little change over the preceding decade.
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married households had continuing claims on pensions from current or previous jobs (bottom
row, column 3).
10  Their plans were worth $154,512 per married household and $207,868 per
married household with a pension.  Sixty four percent of married men, 53 percent of  single men,
44 percent of single women, and 37 percent of married women had claims on pensions from their
own work.  Among those with claims on pensions, the values are very similar on average for
single men ($197,744) and for married men ($197,305).  Next in value are the pensions of single
women ($93,731), and then married women ($75,230).  
We have found that pensions are worth $190,621 for each covered household in the HRS,
and that more than two thirds of households are approaching retirement with the benefit of assets
that originated in pensions.  Clearly, pensions are an important source of support in retirement. 
The leg of the retirement stool represented by pensions is quite substantial.
Although two thirds of households have a current pension that is paying or will pay them
benefits, three quarters of households report they were ever covered by a pension.  The remaining
plans were cashed out or rolled over, or the individual left before vesting.  
Not counting the loss from terminating a backloaded pension, less than ten percent of the
current value of pensions has been lost as a direct result of turnover.  Table 3 indicates the values
and frequencies of pensions earned in last and previous jobs by the disposition of those plans. 
Mean benefits from last or previous pensions are $30,449 (6,786 + 23,663).  In addition, HRS
respondents report $9,214 in total pension value of plans that they received a cash settlement on,
rolled over or lost the benefit (5,850 + 2,070 + 1,294).  Thus with a total of $74,461 in expected11
pension value per individual in the HRS from current, last and previous jobs, there is an additional
$9,214, or 12.4 percent (9,214/74,461) in value originating in pensions that no longer are in
pensions, or were lost. In judging how much of the 12.4 percent represents a reduction in savings
attributable to premature pension distribution, bear in mind that some current assets may have
originated as pension cashouts; and current IRA balances reflect rollovers.   On the other hand,
these losses do not include the effects of pension backloading, which reduces the value of benefits
for those who leave a firm before qualifying for early retirement under a DB plan.  Although the
values per respondent of pensions that were lost ($42,579), and that were taken as cash benefits
($61,946) are substantial, these values fall below the value per respondent of pensions from a
previous job that were rolled over, ($115,405) or are expected ($87,826), and are dwarfed by the
value of pensions from last or previous jobs that are currently in receipt ($218,906).
There is another implication of the importance of  pensions from last or previous jobs, an
implication that becomes even more important with the aging of the cohort.  If pensions are
ignored, then a study of savings behavior based on the change in wealth from one wave to
another may discover that for some respondents, total wealth has increased sharply, implying very
high savings or unreported capital gains or other windfalls.  The pension cashouts and rollovers
are large enough that the amount of "Magic Money" appearing between the waves can have a
substantial adverse effect on any analysis of savings behavior.
Social Security Wealth In The HRS Sample
Using the same 2.3 percent real interest rate we used to discount the value of pensions,
social security wealth (based on retired worker benefits paid to the covered worker and to the11These calculations of spouse and survivor benefits follow all of the rules for treating dual
beneficiaries.
12In contrast to the figures presented in the previous tables, and in contrast to the social
security values as of 1992 that will be presented in the tables that follow, these benefits and taxes
are computed as of the expected age of retirement.  This allows us to calculate the money's worth
from the payroll tax payments made for social security.  Taxes paid by members of the HRS
cohort who did not survive to be included in the survey are not included, causing the benefit-tax
ratio to be overstated.  Note that the expected retirement date is only one of a number of possible
measures of retirement status in the HRS.  For a discussion and data, see Gustman, Mitchell and
Steinmeier (1995).
13There are other considerations which may enter into a money's worth calculations,
including tax rates.  See Leimer (1995) for further discussion. 
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spouse or survivor) is valued at about 13 percent more than pension wealth.
11  This can be seen in
the first set of results in Table 4.
12  There social security wealth per household is worth $141,675,
while pension wealth per household was seen to be $124,991.  At the constant 2.3 percent real
interest rate used in row 1 of Table 4, for the HRS cohort social security would appear to be a
good deal on average.  Comparing social security benefits and employer and employee payroll
taxes paid to support old age and survivors benefits, the present value of benefits exceeds the
value of tax payments by about a fifth.
13 
As in row 1 of Table 4, calculations of social security money's worth often use the same
low interest rate to evaluate benefits and payroll tax payments received or made at different times. 
However, the pattern of interest rates affecting the HRS cohort is far from constant. Thus row 2
of Table 4 reports a second set of results.  These assume that the nominal value of taxes paid to
the social security system is inflated by the rate of interest already realized in the years that the tax
payments were made, using the interest rate on 10 year government bonds (Economic Report of
the President, 1995, Table B-72).  Social security benefits and contributions made after 1992 are14This result is consistent with some money's worth calculations made by Leimer (1994,
Appendix E).  Social security retirement benefits are an even poorer deal if we count the
contributions of those in the cohort who have already died and thus are not represented in the
HRS survey.  However, to the extent that the Social Security Actuaries sufficiently underestimate
life expectancy, social security may still turn out to be a break even or better proposition for those
in the HRS cohort.
15Social security will continue to be a good investment for many of those in the HRS
cohort who have low or modest incomes.  Indeed, at the low interest rates used in this analysis,
but not at higher interest rates, many people would stay with the current system even if allowed to
choose a privatized alternative.  See Gustman and Steinmeier (1998).
16Ad hoc increases in social security benefits granted in the 1970's and at other times in the
history of social security are similar to start up benefits in a pay as you go system.  
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discounted using the intermediate assumptions for interest rates from SSA (Annual Report of
Board of Trustees, 1995, Table II.D1, intermediate assumptions, p. 56), which fall to a steady
state real rate of just below 2.3 percent.  
Comparing benefits and tax payments for the members of the HRS cohort, social security
is not a good deal on average.  The resulting present value of benefits falls below the present
value of tax payment by about 10 percent.
14   Thus social security will not just be a poor financial
investment on average for those reaching retirement age after the turn of the century, the bad
news is already here.
15 
To be sure, it was well known that once a pay as you go system matures, the rate of return
declines.  The high return in a pay as you system to the initial generation of recipients cannot be
maintained.
16  Moreover, the consequences of the demographic problems facing the system have
been widely anticipated.  What these results tell us that is new is how far along we are in the
transition, and that the negative average returns have become manifest sooner than many
expected.  In addition, there are other factors which have operated over time to reduce the17Throughout this paper, we use the terms total wealth and total net wealth, and total
assets and total net assets, are used interchangeably.  The understanding is that liabilities are
subtracted from assets in all calculations, and thus that wealth and assets are shorthand for assets
net of liabilities.
18Note again that the social security wealth value in Table 4 is computed on the
assumption of work to expected retirement date, discounted to 1992, while the pension wealth
and social security wealth values in Table 5 are based only on work until 1992.  This puts the
pension and social security wealth reported in Table 5 on identical footing with the wealth
accumulated in other forms as of 1992.  We continue to discount social security values using the
interest projections of the actuaries, which are higher in the early years than the constant 2.3
percent rate used to discount pensions.  Because the program used to evaluate pensions can take
only one interest rate, we are unable, at this stage, to discount pensions with a varying interest
rate.  Adjusting the wealth values of pensions for the difference in the interest rate would reduce
their value by about 15 percent.
19These wealth figures do not include the wealth equivalent of income transfer programs,
Medicare or transfers in kind.  
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benefit-cost ratio of social security to covered households.  For the HRS cohort, the very low
ceiling on earnings subject to the payroll tax which was in place in the earlier years of the system,
is much less relevant than it was for older cohorts.  Moreover, with the increase in dual earner
families, the subsidy to nonworking wives is becoming less important than it was in the past.
How Important Are Pensions And Social Security In Total Wealth, And Relative To Private
Wealth?
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As seen in Table 5, pensions and social security each account for about a quarter of total
wealth in the HRS sample.
18  Nonpension, nonsocial security wealth accounts for the other half of
total wealth, the main component of which is housing wealth, worth 16 percent of total wealth. 
Business wealth, and real estate (which includes nonhousing wealth), each account for 8 percent
of total wealth.  Financial assets account for 9 percent of total wealth, and IRA assets account for
4 percent.
19  20More specifically, when the data are available, we estimate lifetime earnings in the HRS
from social security earnings histories.  Where information is not available because there is no
matched social security record, or where the data in the social security record are incomplete, or
truncated, then the information on the earnings record is augmented not only by information
provided by the respondent on current, last and previous job earnings, but also by a set of
questions in wave 3 inquiring about covered earnings history.  The estimate of lifetime earnings
uses information from the self reported earnings history under a number of circumstances: when
the social security record is missing; when the maximum level of social security covered earnings
is reached and self reported earnings exceed it; when the respondent holds multiple jobs and
earnings for each job cannot be separately estimated, when the last year on the record is a partial
year; or when the years of work reported by the respondent in a job differ from those in the social
security record.  The wage equation used in these cases is from our previous work.  It uses the
following coefficients for age related variables: coefficient on age =  0.0138221; coefficient on
age
2 = -0.0002827; coefficient on age*education = 0.000996. 
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For the median ten percent of households arrayed by wealth holding, pensions account for
22 percent of total wealth, while social security represents 38 percent of their total wealth.  This
can be seen in the second panel in Table 5, which reports outcomes for households falling in the
45th to 55th percentiles, when households are arrayed by total wealth.  Except for house value,
other assets represent a much smaller share of the total wealth for the median ten percent of
households arrayed by wealth than they do on average, with nonpension, nonsocial security
wealth averaging 39.8 percent of total wealth for the median ten percent of households.  
A major advantage of the HRS is that it provides the social security earnings history, and
supplementary information that permits us to measure lifetime earnings with much greater
accuracy than is usually possible with retrospective self reported data.  Self reports typically
provide information on current, last and some previous jobs, or on longest job.  But the work
history is usually incomplete, especially for women.
20
Pensions are most important for families in the top three fourths of the lifetime earnings
distribution. Row 1 of Table 6 reports average pension wealth by place in the lifetime earnings21This measure of lifetime wealth does not include potential inheritance, or the value of
human capital based on market work after 1992.
22Each asset or the present values equivalent of each income stream, is subject to a
different rate of taxation.  Pensions are tax deferred, but the amount of taxes ultimately paid
depend on the precise mechanism that is used in realizing the pension benefit; e.g., how and when
a DC account is rolled over into an IRA, on the length of any minimum guaranteed period of
payment in the event that the beneficiary dies, on which spouse collects the bulk of the payments,
on what their incomes are at that time, etc..  Social security taxes depend on the income of the
recipient family.  Housing wealth, stocks, real estate, business wealth, and some other forms of
wealth have capital gains components, but some of these sources of income may be subject to
taxation at ordinary rates.    
23Rows 3 through 6 of Table 6 report various measures of lifetime earnings and wealth for
each bracket in the lifetime earnings distribution.  These figures are the basis for calculating how
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distribution and row 2 reports the ratio of pension to total wealth.  Pensions represent at least a
fifth of total wealth for those falling in each bracket after the twenty fifth percentile.  From row 2,
we also see that the ratio of average pension wealth to total wealth increases with lifetime
earnings throughout most of the distribution, peaking at 30 percent of total wealth for those in the
75th to 95th percentile brackets of the lifetime earnings distribution, and then declining to 28
percent of wealth for the upper five percent of the distribution.  
Relation of Total Wealth To Lifetime Earnings
For the full sample, average lifetime wealth is equal to 39 percent of average lifetime
earnings.
21  Elements of both the numerator and the denominator of the wealth-income ratio are
subject to taxation, with the numerator probably subject to lower tax rates than the denominator.
22 
Because we have insufficient information to determine relevant tax rates to impose on each asset,
we ignore taxes in these calculations.  As seen in row 7 of Table 6, the ratio of wealth to lifetime
earnings in the indicated bracket is highest for those in the bottom ten percent of the earnings
distribution and then declines.
23   Although ratios of median wealth to lifetime earnings (row 8)wealth accumulation varies with lifetime earnings. Notice that while the means are the same for
the All category in the last column of Table 6 as for the mean wealth reported in Table 5, the
results for the median ten percent of households do not correspond between Tables 5 and Table 6. 
 The medians differ because households in Table 6 are ordered by lifetime earnings, while the
households in Table 5 are ordered by total wealth. 
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are lower than are the ratios of the means, the ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings increases only
very slightly between the 25th and 100th percentile.  We find that wealth accumulation as a share
of lifetime earnings does not vary significantly and positively with lifetime earnings.  Rather, it is
uniformly distributed with lifetime earnings throughout most of the distribution, and falls
significantly for the upper five percent of earnings recipients.  These findings are consistent with
Venti and Wise (1998), who computed total wealth in the HRS using the social security records
and self reported pension values for a subset of the HRS sample.    
On its face, the constancy of the ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings is consistent with the
results from a simple life cycle model.   This finding is based on a very simple calculation, taking
the present value of wealth in the numerator, and the simple sum of real earnings in the
denominator, and seems like a good starting point.  Our later findings examining the relationship
between pensions and wealth in a multivariate equation will suggest that the explanation of wealth
accumulation from a simple life cycle model is inadequate.
Replacement Rates
Replacement rates may be measured for many different groups, and interpreted in a
number of ways.  In what follows we measure various features of the distributions of replacement
rates, in nominal and real terms, and also for groups arrayed by wealth and by lifetime earnings. 
We compare replacement rates from wealth accumulated to date with replacement rates from
wealth accumulated by expected retirement age.  In addition, we briefly discuss the literature on24The replacement rate is defined as the annuitized asset value divided by the sum of own
and spouses preretirement earnings.  The nominal annuity is computed at 6.3 percent over the
expected lifetime of the household.  In the case of the nominal annuity, the replacement rate is
affected by the indexing of social security benefits in that indexing raises the present value of
social security.  The denominator for each person is calculated as the most recent earnings for the
individual, except if prior earnings exceed 150% of the last wage.  The last year's earnings are
indexed up to 1992 using the overall hourly wage index.  High earnings are indexed into the
future at a 4% rate.  For couple households, the annuity factors used in calculating the
replacement rate are calculated with the expected retirement age of the spouse with the largest
lifetime earnings.  If that spouse is already retired in 1992, the annuity is calculated for 1992.  If
the expected retirement age is not reported it is taken to be age 62 (or the current age in 1992 if
the individual is already over age 62).  If the respondent reported he would never retire, the
retirement age is set at age 65.
25Social security benefits for one earner households also involve a two thirds joint and
survivor annuity.  The spouse receives fifty percent of the earnings of the basic benefit, so that
while both spouses are alive, the household receives 150 percent of the basic benefit.  The
survivor is then entitled to 100 percent of the basic benefit, or two thirds of the payment to the
household when both spouses are alive.
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the adequacy of replacement rates, which is relevant for interpreting the extent to which
accumulated wealth can be used to support retirement.
The replacement rates are calculated on the assumption that all current assets and the
wealth equivalent of annuitized retirement income are used to finance a joint and survivor annuity
for couples, or an appropriate annuity for singles.
24  Thus retirement income is calculated as the
value of a two thirds joint and survivor annuity with the same present value as all assets and
retirement incomes.
25  To the extent that the assets that are annuitized will be subject to lower
taxes than income earned during the working years, these replacement rates are understated.
Wealth accumulated to date by the HRS population is sufficient to finance a nominal
annuity generating a replacement rate averaging 86 percent of final earnings. The nominal
replacement rate for households with the median ten percent of lifetime earnings is 97 percent. 
The corresponding real replacement rates average  60 percent for the sample.  Real replacement26Lifetime earnings for the high five percent of earners may be subject to errors in
computation.  because these individuals were at the social security earnings ceiling and had self
reported earnings in excess of their social security earnings, or had high self reported earnings and
no social security record.  Thus there is no check on their past earnings from a social security
earnings record.  Their earnings had to be estimated by fitting an earnings profile to data reported
for their current, last and previous jobs.  The data for the top five percent of earners will be
improved when HRS obtains the matched earnings records from W-2 forms.  Those records are
not available as of the writing of this paper.
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rates for households in the median 10 percent of lifetime earners average 66 percent.  The bottom
two rows of Table 6, rows 9 and 10, present these summary statistics as well as the distribution,
by lifetime earnings, of replacement rates as of the individual's expected date of retirement.  
Replacement rates are highest for those in the bottom ten percent of earners.  This
category may include some who have little earnings and wealth, but given the high wealth to
income ratios, must also include widows or others who have low earnings histories, but nontrivial
amounts of wealth.  As seen in row 9 of Table 6, the only group with a nominal replacement rate
below 80 percent is those in the high five percent of lifetime earners.
26  All groups of lifetime
earners except the high five percent can replace 59 percent or more of their real earnings with
their current assets alone.
Within each lifetime earnings category, the distributions of wealth and replacement rates
are skewed.  Thus within each lifetime earnings category there are some people with relatively
high wealth to earnings ratios.  Accordingly, when the data are arrayed by wealth, the median
replacement rates are lower than when they are arrayed by lifetime earnings.  As seen in Appendix
Table A1, when we calculate replacement income for the 10 percent of households between the
45th and 55th percentiles of the wealth distribution, using a real annuity factor, we get a real
replacement rate of ($21,828/$43,812), or 50 percent. 27These data exclude 322 observations that had zero final earnings, and are based only on
wealth accumulated through 1992.  
28In the context of a discussion to follow, the households of concern are
disproportionately likely to come from the quarter of households who have never had a pension,
and who are among the more than two thirds of those without a pension who are employees,
rather than self employed.  Thus at the 50th percentile of the replacement rate distribution for
those with pensions, the nominal replacement rate is .85.  At the 50th percentile of the distribution
for those without a pension, the nominal replacement rate is .61.  Those with pensions fare much
better in the bottom part of the distribution; at the 10th percentile of replacement rates for those
with a pension, the replacement rate is .41, while it is .20 at the 10th percentile of the distribution
of those without a pension.  On the other hand, at the ninetieth percentile of the replacement rate
distribution for those with a pension, the replacement rate is 1.8, while at the comparable
percentile of the replacement rate distribution for those without a pension, the replacement rate is
2.6.
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To judge the distribution of replacement rates, Table 7 arrays the replacement rates by
size.
27  For one fourth of the population, the nominal replacement rate based on savings to 1992 is
50 percent or lower and the real replacement rate is one third or lower.  These households are
sufficiently numerous to be an important focus of public policy.
28  
However, these replacement rate figures do not include any additional savings to be
accrued between 1992 and retirement, the positive return to real assets that will accrue before
retirement, including atypically large gains from the stock market since 1992, and they do not
include the continued accrual of pension value.  Accordingly, the replacement rates in Table 7
understate the replacement rates that will be enjoyed when the HRS respondents reach retirement
age.  Moreover, the replacement rate figures also do not incorporate payments from transfer
programs such as SSI or Medicaid, and they do not include earnings from part-time work beyond
the expected retirement date, again causing them to be understated.
It is possible to estimate crudely the additional asset accumulation and savings that may be
expected for this group, and its effect on the replacement rates.  The HRS population on average29First, there are 7 or so more years for assets to accumulate interest, or for the benefits
under DB plans to be prorated.  At a 2.3 percent real interest rate (given the run up in stocks
since 1992, the return may be higher depending on the share of retirement and other assets held in
stocks), which we also apply to housing, and assuming real wages are constant for those
approaching retirement (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1985), that amounts to about a 17 percent real
accumulation over current balances.  In addition, there are seven years to save.  If in total half a
year's earnings (7 percent per year) are saved out of final income, and the annuity factor is 10.8
for the nominal annuity and 15.7 for the real one, then a half year's savings = .5/15.7, or another
3.2 percent real income, or .5/10.8, which is 4.6 percent to be added to the nominal replacement
rate.  Therefore, median real replacement rates are increased to .52*(.03+1.17)=.62.  Nominal
replacement rates are increased  to .79*(.046+1.17)=0.96. 
30For the medians of real and nominal replacement rates, the two adjustments, increasing
assets in view of the next seven years of savings, and reducing assets for housing wealth, would
roughly be a wash.
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was 56 years old in 1992.  They report seven to eight years to go before retiring.  Very roughly,
understating a number of these effects, the additional accrual of returns to accumulated retirement
assets, and additional savings out of income until retirement, would raise the median real
replacement rate to about 0.62, and the median nominal replacement rate to 0.96.
29  Other
measures of replacement rates discussed above could also be similarly adjusted, increasing the
nominal and real replacement rates by about a fifth around the mean.
Some (e.g., Bernheim, 1993) will argue there should be a downward adjustment in the
replacement rate from these values because housing should not be counted.  Such an adjustment
would reduce our estimates of replacement rates at retirement age by about 16 percent of their
current value to 53 percent real and 83 percent nominal replacement rates.
30  Nevertheless,
because implicit rent from housing frees up a portion of post retirement income for other
purchases, because housing wealth also serves as a precautionary asset, and because housing
wealth may be used to finance other end of life expenditures (e.g., a nursing home stay), one
could also argue that housing should be fully valued in calculating the replacement rate.31There also is a question about what to do with interest earnings and returns on other
assets in computing replacement rates.  That is, as one accumulates assets for retirement,
preretirement income is inflated.  But the asset income may be dedicated to the formation of
assets to support consumption in retirement, and thus would not be properly included in the
preretirement income base.  Housing wealth creates a particular problem in this regard.  We
include the imputed annuity income from housing wealth to the postretirement period, counting
housing as a retirement asset.  But that approach may be debated.
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Adequacy of Replacement Rates
There is no agreed upon standard for an adequate replacement rate.  But there are many
adjustments that can have a considerable effect on the replacement rate.  For example, using data
from the Retirement History Study, Boskin and Shoven (1987) calculate adjustments that more
than double the replacement rate, increasing a replacement rate of around 70 percent for couples,
calculated using the preceding methods, to over 140 percent.  Even if exaggerated (see the
comment by Gustman on Boskin and Shoven), a similar set of adjustments would mean that the
real replacement rate based on current assets, after a joint and survivor annuity, may be close to
100 percent.  What are these adjustments? First there are the adjustments used by many
researchers.  In the preretirement period, the individual was saving.  To maintain consumption
after retirement, less income is required since preretirement saving is no longer required.
31   There
also are work related costs, and differences in taxes (the tax treatment of social security is not as
favorable as it had been, but still favors social security over other forms of income, especially for
those in the middle and bottom of the income distribution).  Altogether, these reduce the required
replacement rate to three fourths or perhaps a little lower (McGill, Brown, Haley and Schieber,
1996).  Boskin and Shoven do not define the appropriate standard solely in terms of income
realized just before retirement, however.  They argue that the appropriate consumption standard
is average earnings over the worklife, not last high earnings.  There should be adjustments for32Boskin and Shoven (1987) also argue that there should be an adjustment for income
uncertainty, which they claim is reduced due to the relative stability of social security.
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changes in the family unit.  Children are no longer home and thus associated costs are reduced.
32 
Beyond these factors, there should be some adjustment for the length of the retirement period. 
An early retiree is enjoying a much longer period of leisure than one who chooses to retire at
older ages.  Thus if we are trying to replace utility, an adequacy standard should be adjusted for
any difference in leisure, which would imply the need for intertemporal adjustments in utility
associated with choice of retirement date.  In addition, the capacity for certain types of
consumption may fall with age, while medical and related needs may increase.  
The reader is free to interpret the replacement rates reported in this paper as to their
adequacy.  If Boskin and Shoven are right, these replacement rates are adequate.  If not, they fall
short of providing adequate replacement, but are not grossly inadequate.  Whether or not Boskin
and Shoven's adjustments are considered to be appropriate, it is hard to find evidence of a massive
crisis in retirement undersaving of the type that has been promoted in the media.  
What Does The Literature Say About How Pensions Affect Savings?
The Theory
The theory is ambiguous about whether the availability of pensions will reduce other forms
of savings.  A stripped down version of the life cycle model suggests that, with caveats about
market imperfections and liquidity constraints, there should be a full offset between pension
savings and savings in other forms.  Moreover, a major theme of the pension literature rationalizes
pensions as a tax favored savings device, implying that people will directly substitution pensions33For a review of these and other explanations for pensions, see Gustman, Mitchell and
Steinmeier (1994).  Despite tax advantages, pensions are not a perfect vehicle for savings.  The
pension is a public good and pension choice, especially under a DB plan, will be aimed at the
median or some other representative worker, making it less well targeted for most of the work
force.
34Consistent with this argument is the idea that many people in the bottom part of the
income distribution may be over annuitized due to social security and pensions.  Buying life
insurance helps to eliminate over annuitization only if there is a substantial bequest motive. (For a
related discussion, see Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Weil, 1992).  Even pensions that do not require
annuitization, but can be cashed out as a lump sum upon reaching retirement age, may still lead
some families to enter retirement with more wealth than they would like, given their lifetime
incomes.  There also is a suggestion that when workers with higher levels of education are
covered by pensions, they are more likely to substitute for pensions by reducing other savings
than are individuals with lower levels of education, for whom pension assets are more likely to
add to total wealth (Bernheim and Scholz, 1993).  
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for other savings.
33  However, for some, forced saving by social security and pensions will be
higher than the total savings they would otherwise choose, and it cannot be offset because
borrowing is limited.  If there is substantial heterogeneity in time preference, and in the absence of
pensions some fraction of the population would approach retirement with little or no financial
assets, relying instead on a high replacement rate from social security, then coverage by a pension
will necessarily increase the total wealth they bring into retirement by creating such forced
savings.  This is especially important for some individuals in the bottom part of the lifetime
earnings distribution.  Social security creates a very high replacement rate for those with low
earnings, and as we have seen, pension wealth and social security wealth together account for a
substantial part of wealth throughout the lifetime earnings distribution.
34  Even with the possibility
of borrowing on the pension, borrowing constraints may prevent many from driving nonpension,
nonsocial security wealth sufficiently negative to achieve an optimal consumption path in the
preretirement period.  35There is a relationship between the question of whether there is inadequate savings for
retirement and the question of whether pensions increase saving.  If those with pensions save
more in other forms because information gained from employers and when dealing with their
pensions teaches them about the importance of retirement savings, then it is not too much of a
leap to suggest that ignorance rather than choice may be responsible for some people undersaving
for retirement.  An implication is that if increased awareness is one result of creating privatized
social security accounts, privatization could lead many to increase their retirement savings.
36Even if pensions are exogenous to the savings decision, including current balances in
401(k) plans as right hand side measures in a wealth equation would invite spurious correlation
based on any unmeasured taste for saving.  Since such plans involve contemporaneous voluntary
25
Early empirical findings indicating that pensions did not reduce savings led to speculation
about other dimensions of behavior that might account for this result.  Most of these explanations
are rooted in imperfections in information about the need for retirement savings.  Some have
argued that information provided by employers who offer pensions make the individual aware of
the need for retirement saving and lead them to save more, rather than less (Cagan, 1965; Katona,
1965).
35  Clark and Schieber (forthcoming) suggest that employer education programs encourage
increased participation in 401(k) plans.  Bernheim, Garrett and Maki (1997) suggest that those
who have been exposed to consumer and financial education save more.  Feldstein (1974)
hypothesizes that those with pensions intend to retire earlier than those without pensions, and
therefore that pension covered workers may accumulate additional assets to finance their earlier
retirement.    
A further question is whether those who are more likely to save are systematically selected
into pension plans, so that any correlation between pension coverage and wealth accumulation
does not reflect causality running from pensions to savings.  There is some evidence suggesting
systematic selection into pension covered jobs.  Thus in investigating the pension-wealth
relationship, it will be important to standardize for any differences in tastes.
36 It is noteworthy thatcontributions, balances in the plans are not predetermined from the perspective of the savings
decision.  Therefore in computing balances in 401(k) and other DC pension plans, we use firm
contributions applied to each individual, rather than the self reported balance obtained from the
respondent interview.  These calculations assume that all mandatory contributions are made by the
individual.  When there are voluntary contributions, employees are assumed to contribute the
permitted voluntary amount up to a maximum of 5 percent of salary, whether or not there is
matching by the firm.  In that sense, the pension value measures used as right hand side variables
in the wealth equations estimated below are instruments for the true amount of pension savings
accumulated by the respondent. 
37There may be some suggestion that whatever relation is found in descriptive data
between pension wealth and nonpension wealth is due to self selection of savers into pension
covered jobs.  Consistent with this view, Johnson (1996) argues that pensions are endogenously
determined by selection of the lifetime job.  However, Allen, Clark and McDermed (1993) find no
indication of selection into pension covered jobs on the basis of unobservables.  The pension
literature raises doubts about the importance of systematic selection into pension covered jobs on
the basis of plan characteristics (Gustman, Mitchell and Steinmeier, 1994).
38Note that in contrast with the HRS, which includes only those on the verge of
retirement, these studies include data for the full working age population.  See the review of the
relevant literature in Gustman and Juster (1996).  
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there is little evidence of selection into pension covered jobs on the basis of unobservables.
37 
Prior Empirical Research
Empirical analysts have devoted a great deal of attention to the question of whether
pensions increase savings (see the review by Munnell and Yohn, 1992).  Some studies compare
wealth or wealth to income ratios to pension coverage (Sabelhaus, 1996).  Two recent studies,
using self reported pension values and self reported but incomplete lifetime and social security
covered earnings histories, suggest that pension wealth is heavily offset by reductions in other
wealth (Gale, 1995; Kennickell and Sunden, 1997).
38  Results seem to be sensitive to whether the
independent variable is specified as pension coverage or pension value, measured as the
contribution rate, yearly benefit amount, or present value of the pension.  They also are sensitive
to whether pension equations are specified to standardize for expected retirement date, horizons39Gale notes: "Taken at face value the literature shows little offset between pensions and
other wealth; most of the studies suggests offsets of 20 percent or less, and almost half suggest
either no offset at all or a positive net effect of pensions on other wealth." (1995, p. 6)  Gale
concludes his analysis as follows: "This paper shows that previous empirical research understates
the offset between pension wealth and non-pension wealth due to a series of systematic biases. 
These findings imply that even previously estimated positive effects of pensions on non-pension
wealth may be consistent with full offset or a substantial amount of offset once the biases have
been removed."  (1995, page 29).
40Engen, Gale and Scholz argue that 401(k) eligibility is not exogenous.  It may also be
possible that some pension assets are substituted for other pension wealth.  For example, 401(k)
assets might be substituted for assets that would otherwise be held in defined benefit plans or in
conventional defined contribution plans.  The stagnation of DB plan benefits, and the decline in
coverage, reinforce the suggestion of some substitution between 401(k) plans and other pensions. 
For evidence of the relation of adoption of DC plans to DB plan termination, see Papke (1997).
41There is a major debate raging on the extent of substitution between IRA assets and
other savings, and 401(k) assets and other savings.  A recent issue of Journal of Economic
Perspectives presents an exchange between Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) and Engen, Gale and
Scholz (1996).  Although there are many issues that have yet to be resolved in the debate, this
exchange does suggest that the Gale and Scholz findings of very high  substitution between IRA
balances and savings are extremely fragile.  
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and other factors that otherwise will result in mismeasurement of lifetime wealth, earnings or
pension wealth (Munnell and Yohn, 1992; Gale, 1995).
39  Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996) treat
the adoption of 401(k) plans as a natural experiment.  Their findings suggest that pensions add to
savings.  Although they uncover evidence of some substitution, those with 401(k) plans save
substantially more than they otherwise would.
40  That is, those with 401(k) plans do not reduce
the amounts they would have saved in other vehicles by anywhere near the amount they hold in
their 401(k) plans, so that much of 401(k) assets represents new savings.
41   
Descriptive Analysis
Wealth-Earnings Ratios And Pensions
In a simple regression, pension coverage does not provide a consistent explanation for42Lifetime earnings are indexed by the CPI, but are not adjusted by a real interest rate.  
43One might conjecture that this finding reflects a mechanical effect of social security:
those with pensions have higher lifetime earnings than those without pensions, and social security
benefits represent a smaller share of the total wealth for those with pensions than for those
without pensions.   This conjecture assumes that social security is not offset by changes in other
wealth.
44For the sample as a whole, the ratio of total net wealth to lifetime earnings is just under
forty percent (.386).
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variation in wealth-earnings ratios.  Results of a simple OLS regression are reported in the first
row, first column of Table 8.  The coefficient on pension coverage is negative and significantly
related to the ratio of total wealth to lifetime earnings.
42  Thus the univariate OLS results suggest
that pensions do not increase wealth accumulation, and indeed suggest that pensions reduce total
wealth.
43  But when we turn to a median regression, which downplays the importance of those
with high wealth earnings ratios and weakens the influence of outliers, the coefficient changes sign
and becomes +.10.  (The R
2 increases, but it still is not very high)  For the sample as a whole,
pension wealth accounts for about 25 percent of total wealth, and among those with pensions,
pensions account for about 30 percent of total wealth.  That means that pensions are associated
with roughly a 25 percent increase in total wealth (.1/.4), where .4 is the ratio of total wealth to
total lifetime earnings.
44  Robust regression provides a similar coefficient.  
To take account of variation in pension value within the group of pension covered
workers, the second row of Table 8 relates the ratio of total net assets over lifetime earnings to
the ratio of pension wealth over lifetime earnings, where absence of pension coverage implies zero
pension wealth.  The OLS regression suggests that total wealth is increased by more than dollar
for dollar with an increase in pension wealth, an effect that is larger than the effect estimated with45To further investigate the effects of measurement error, we screened the observations for
those with especially high ratios of pension wealth to lifetime earnings, to which the median and
robust regressions would be less sensitive.  Twenty observations have a pension wealth/lifetime
earnings ratio that is greater than one.  To investigate the sensitivity of the results to these twenty
observations, we reran the regressions with those observations deleted.  The OLS results in
regressions where total wealth/earnings ratios are regressed on pension coverage are not at all
sensitive to the presence of these observations.  But the regression of total wealth/earnings ratios
on pension wealth/earnings ratios are very sensitive.  When the twenty observations are deleted,
the coefficient on the ratio of pension wealth to total wealth falls to 0.22.  This value is much
below the values estimated with median and robust regression, which fall only slightly when the
twenty observations are deleted.  A coefficient of 0.22 suggests that on the margin, an added
dollar of pension wealth is substituted for other wealth, so marginal increases in pensions reduce
total savings.  In contrast, a coefficient of 1.16, the result when the twenty observations are
retained, suggests that a marginal increase in pension wealth is associated with more than a dollar
for dollar increase in total wealth, so that pension wealth not only results in new savings, but that
pensions encourage additional savings.
It appears that these results are sensitive to measurement of lifetime earnings rather than
to the measurement of total wealth or pensions.  The pension wealth figures are computed on the
basis of the last few years of self reported earnings.  Social security earnings histories are used to
compute lifetime earnings.  Social security earnings are supplemented by self reported earnings
when a social security record is not available, or the individual is at the social security earnings
ceiling.  When we rerun a regression specifying total wealth on the left hand side and pension
value on the right hand side, the coefficient in OLS is 1.59.  When the twenty observations with
pension wealth to lifetime earnings ratios greater than one are eliminated, the coefficient using
OLS is 1.61.  This suggests that it is variation in lifetime earnings in the denominator of the total
wealth and pension wealth ratios that is the source of the sensitivity of the OLS findings. 
Accordingly, when we run regressions on pension value below, we focus on results for the value
of total wealth as a function of pension wealth, controlling for lifetime earnings, although we will
also present results in ratio form.
29
median or robust regression.  
Obviously, these findings are fragile and somewhat contradictory.  Further analysis
suggests that the overall negative relation between pension coverage and wealth is generated by
mismeasurement of lifetime earnings, where the effect of such mismeasurement is to create
outliers in the ratio formulation.
45  Before considering multivariate analysis, we turn to more
detailed descriptions of the relation of pensions to total wealth.
Business Assets and Real Estate Holdings As Offsets To Pension Wealth30
What are the differences in asset holding between households with and without pensions? 
Table 9 shows that the share of wealth held as business assets and real estate is about 23 percent
higher for those without pensions than for those with pensions.  Although they have only a little
more than half the wealth of households with pensions, households without pensions average over
$30,000 more in business assets and real estate than do those with pensions.  Thus on a
mechanical level, the results in Tables 9 may be read to suggest that because those without
pensions hold a significantly greater portion of their wealth in the form of business and real estate
assets, pension coverage is not associated with any additional savings.  
But this generalization is too simplistic.  A closer look at the data suggests that only some
of those without pensions are responsible for the large holding of business assets and real estate. 
Business wealth and real estate holdings are concentrated among a minority of those with and
without pensions.  Among households without pensions, mean holdings of business assets and real
estate assets are $103,350, while $1,972 in business and real estate assets are held by the median
10 percent of wealth holding households without pensions.  Among those with pensions, holdings
of business and real estate assets are also concentrated among a minority at the high end of the
wealth distribution.  
Other differences between households with and without pensions also make it difficult to
generalize about the adjustment to pension coverage.  With mean total wealth of $555,644,
households with pensions are almost twice as wealthy as households without pensions, with total
wealth of $289,398.  Wealth is much more evenly distributed among households with pensions
than among those without pensions.  While there is a two to one difference in the ratio of mean
total wealth between households with and without pensions, there is a four to one difference in46Detailed tables reporting these distributions are available in a longer report with the same
name as this paper, submitted to the Department of Labor.
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the medians.  
Heterogeneity among employees and self employed, with and without pensions, affects the
apparent relation between pensions, lifetime earnings and accumulated wealth.  Employees with
pensions are disproportionately concentrated in the 50th to 90th percentile of lifetime earners.
46 
More dramatically, 18 percent of the self employed with pensions are counted among the top five
percent of lifetime earners.  On the other hand, employees without pensions are disproportionately
concentrated among low earners, with 24 percent of employees without pensions falling in the
bottom five percent of all lifetime earners, 18 percent falling in the next lowest five percent of
lifetime earners, and 32 percent of employees without pensions falling in the tenth to twenty fifth
percentile of lifetime earners.  
More generally, as long as firms are shaping pension plans to meet the desires of their
workers, we cannot be sure that the measured differences in wealth-earnings ratios associated
with having a pension reflect only the effects of pensions on savings.  Rather, there remains a
danger that any measured relationship between wealth and pension values may be contaminated
by unmeasured differences among individuals in their motivations for saving and their propensity
to save, differences that are correlated with pension measures.  
It is not reasonable to treat holdings of real estate and business wealth as if they were due
either entirely to a desire to adjust for the effects of pension coverage, or to ignore holdings of
business and real estate wealth when measuring offsets to pension coverage. One compromise will47While it might be argued that there is something peculiar about those with business and
real estate assets, 31 percent of respondents have some real estate or business wealth.  Therefore,
it is not reasonable to simply eliminate anyone with business or real estate wealth from the
analysis.  
48That means that an analysis of the pension-savings relation that includes the self
employed in the sample may find that total wealth-income ratios are no higher for those with
pensions than for those without pensions.  Yet for employees, the wealth-income ratio is about
five points higher for those with pensions than for those without pensions (Table 10).  
49There are other reasons for differentiating the self employed in an analysis of savings. 
Most fundamentally, the self employed may have a different motivation for holding wealth than
the classical life cycle, precautionary and bequest motives.  They may have to hold some wealth as
a cost of being able to pursue self employment.  And of course they may face very different risks
from those faced by employees.  With a fourth, self employment motivation for holding wealth,
we also must be aware that studies of lifecycle savings, precautionary savings and bequests might
be confounded by the capitalization motivation governing asset accumulation by the self
employed.  For a related discussion, see Gentry and Hubbard (1997).
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be to control for self employment status.
47  The data in Table 10 suggest that it is employees
without pensions who are least well prepared for retirement.  Self employed people without
pensions have wealth to lifetime earnings ratios that are higher than either the employed or the self
employed with pensions.
48  Our examination of distributions of wealth holding by type, by pension
and self employment status indicates, however, that controlling for self employment will not
completely account for the tendency of those without pensions to hold more in the way of
business and real estate assets.  In addition, there are other substantial differences in the
composition of those with and without pensions.  Nevertheless, standardizing for self employment
status in the regressions, and running regressions separately for the self employed and employees,
will remove important differences that may be correlated with pension coverage.
49
Multivariate Analysis of the Relation Between Total Assets and Pensions
The multivariate analysis attempts to control for major differences between those who are50About a third of the pension formulas were not available and had to be hot decked
(matched on a random basis from a group with similar occupation, industry, union status, etc.). 
To the extent these are measured with error, the coefficient of the pension value measure in the
total wealth equation will be biased.  In a study now in progress, we are utilizing the self reported
information on pensions to reduce the errors in measuring pension value.
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covered by a pension and those who are not.  Gale (1995) argues that the proper measurement of
pensions, wealth and lifetime earnings, and inclusion of indicators of stage of the lifecycle are
central to estimating the pension offset correctly.  Our specification includes lifecycle measures,
and a list of covariates related to occupation and industry.  The dependent variable is a
comprehensive measure of total wealth, with different versions including and excluding pension
wealth as estimated from employer provided pension plan descriptions.  Independent variables
include a measure of pension coverage, and in another version, the value of pension wealth.
50  The
remainder of the independent variables include lifetime earnings measured from the social security
earnings history augmented by self reported earnings and work history (entered linearly in the
levels equation, and as ln lifetime earnings in the log and ratio specifications), indicators of
whether the household is headed by a single male or female, and the share of household earnings
due to the male.  More specifically, for the spouse with the highest lifetime earnings, we include
self employment status, age, retirement horizon, veteran's status, health, work in manufacturing,
public employment, work in management, professional, white collar, firm size and union status. 
Independent variables for the household also include indicators of race reported as Black or
Hispanic, whether there are children in the household and whether they live home, whether there
is a child in college, indicators of highest level of schooling in the household, and whether anyone
in the household reports themselves to be in fair or poor health.  
We are estimating a reduced form, and at this stage of our work do not link the34
specification tightly to any particular model.  Accordingly, we are very interested in the
robustness of the findings.  Therefore, we consider a variety of functional forms for the
regressions, and run regressions separately for the top and bottom half of lifetime earners.  The
form of the independent pension variable is varied among specifications.  Since the role of
earnings is specified differently in each functional form, some of the differences between these
specifications reflect not only differences between the distributions of levels, logs and ratios, and
the different outliers that arise in these different specifications, but also reflect the way each
specification standardizes for the relationship between total wealth and total earnings.
To further check on the robustness of findings, along with OLS, we also run median and
robust regression.  Both median and robust regression will not be as sensitive to outliers as OLS.
The reader should be aware of the possibility that we may be overcontrolling for
covariates, and thus reducing the amount of the offset.  That is, if pension coverage and plan
generosity are both the result of industry, occupational and other characteristics, if pensions are
more likely to be found and are more generous where retirement is early, and if pension coverage
is more likely and plan benefits are more generous for other reasons associated with the variables
we include, controlling for these and related characteristics may bias down the coefficient on the
pension coverage variable, and perhaps on the measure of pension value if it is measured with
error.  There also is another factor that may lead to a downward bias in the estimated impact of
pensions on assets.  We hot deck pension values for the one third of observations with missing
pension plan descriptions using a set of covariates that overlap with the covariates in the wealth
equations.  On the other hand, it is possible that we do not adjust completely for selection into
pension covered jobs.  Although we have argued above that selection is not likely to be a major51The results may be especially subject to the influence of outliers when the ratio form of
the regression is used, since errors in measuring the denominator of the wealth/earnings ratio, and
the pension/earnings ratio, may cause some severe outliers in both the dependent and independent
variables to be closely correlated.  When the dependent variable is the ratio of wealth to lifetime
earnings, and the independent variable is the ratio of pension wealth to lifetime earnings, if lifetime
earnings are measured with error, the coefficient on the pension variable is likely to be biased
upward.  There is an especially powerful effect when lifetime earnings are badly underestimated. 
That raises the value of both the wealth-earnings ratio and the pension-earnings ratio relative to
the values when lifetime income is correctly measured. 
52We would like pension assets and nonpension assets to be on the same footing with
regard to their tax status.  However, it would be a mistake to simply classify pension assets as
representing before tax value while nonpension assets were treated as after tax value.  Many of
the nonpension assets may be subject to future taxes that are difficult for us to determine.  For
example, assets held in the form of stocks and business and real estate assets may include
unmeasured capital gains.  Moreover, although housing wealth now enjoys a larger exemption
than it did in 1992, at the time of the survey an important share of housing wealth was also
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factor, if there is systematic selection into pension jobs or jobs offering high pension wealth on the
basis of factors that are correlated with savings but not with the covariates we include, then there
will be a bias toward finding that there is no substitution of pensions for other wealth. 
Empirical Findings
Table 11 presents the parameter estimates on the pension coverage variable from
regressions with a variety of specifications, and estimated with a variety of techniques.  In each
regression, pension coverage is defined as coverage by a "live" pension, i.e., a pension that has not
been lost or cashed out.  Two thirds of households are pension covered by this definition.  The
first set of regressions has the dollar value of total wealth as the dependent variable.  In the
second set of regressions, the log of total wealth is the dependent variable.  For the third set of
regressions, the ratio of total wealth to lifetime earnings is the dependent variable.
51  For each pair
of regressions, one specification includes the total of pension plus nonpension wealth as the
dependent variable.
52  The other specification in each pair of regressions includes only nonpensionsubject to capital gains taxes.  Analogously, some pension assets can escape taxation for a very
long time.  Although pension assets will be subject to taxation, it would be a mistake to treat
pension assets as if they will be subject to full taxation.
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wealth as a dependent variable.  The three panels present results for OLS, median and robust
regressions.
The first regression in Table 11 suggests that, controlling for earnings and the other
independent variables, those with pensions have about $99,000 more in total wealth than those
without pensions.  For those with pensions, pension wealth averages about $190,000.  Thus this
first specification suggests that pensions increase total wealth by about half the value of the
pension.  Consistent with this finding, when the dependent variable is specified to be total wealth
excluding pension wealth, the coefficient on the pension coverage variable is negative.  According
to the estimated coefficient, nonpension wealth is lower by about $19,000 for those who are
covered by a pension.  However, the difference between the two coefficients is about $118,000,
which falls well below the value of the pension.  In median and robust regressions, the coefficient
of pension coverage is lower in the regression with total wealth as the dependent variable.  The
coefficient on the pension coverage variable is positive in the specification where the dependent
variable is nonpension wealth, suggesting no pension offset at all and even a small positive effect
of pensions on nonpension wealth.  When we run the specification separately on the bottom half
and top half of earners, as seen in the bottom two rows of columns 1 and 2 of Table 11, the
difference in coefficients comes closer to the value of the pension.  
The fact that the difference between these two measures of the effect of pension coverage
on total wealth and nonpension wealth falls short of the value of pensions is consistent with the
possibility that we are overcontrolling for the correlates of pension coverage.  In the specification53All regressions run with the natural log of wealth as the dependent variable omit
observations where total net assets are negative.  Parameters estimated for the pension measure in
specifications which include the observations with negative assets (i.e., where the dependent
variable is the dollar value of assets or the ratio of assets to lifetime earnings) are not sensitive to
the exclusion of observations with negative total net assets.
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with total wealth as the dependent variable, these additional controls are correlated with both the
pension coverage measure, and with the portion of total wealth due to pensions.  In the
specification with only nonpension wealth as the dependent variable, any joint correlation between
the controls, pension coverage and pension wealth no longer enters into the determination of the
coefficient on the pension coverage variable.
The regressions in columns 3  and 4 specify the dependent variables as the log of total
wealth, with and without pensions.
53  Those with pensions are found to have about 38 percent
more wealth than those with no pensions.  For those who are covered by pensions, their plans are
worth 30 percent of their total wealth.  Accordingly, the log results suggest that rather than
creating an offset in other assets, pension coverage encourages a slight increase in total wealth. 
Consistent with this finding, the coefficient is positive on the pension coverage variable in the
equation with log of wealth excluding pension wealth as the dependent variable.  It also is positive
when the regression is run for the bottom half of earners.  When the regression is run for the top
half of earners in a specification with total wealth excluding pensions as the dependent variable,
the coefficient on pension coverage is negative, but the implied amount of substitution of pensions
for other wealth is very small.   
The third specification examines the relationship between pension coverage and the ratio
of total wealth to lifetime earnings.  Here again the log of lifetime earnings is included as a
separate independent variable, creating a different form of interaction from that in the log38
specification.  These results suggest that pension coverage leads to an increase in pension wealth
that amounts to 19 percent of lifetime earnings.  Because the wealth to earnings ratio is about 40
percent, the suggested increase in total wealth is almost 50 percent.  A positive increase in the
ratio of nonpension wealth to lifetime earnings is also suggested, but this difference is not
significantly different from zero.  When the results are separately estimated between the top and
bottom half of all earners, the effects on the wealth accumulation of lower earners is very large,
but the effect on wealth accumulation of high earners is small.  Only for high earners does there
appear to be any substitution at all of pensions for other wealth, a finding that is consistent with
Bernheim and Scholz (1993).  Comparing the median and robust regressions with OLS, the ratio
specification exhibits the largest differences in estimated coefficients, suggesting that OLS
overstates the effect of pensions on wealth. 
Altogether, these results suggest that the overall effect of pensions is to increase total
wealth, probably by considerably more than half the value of the pension.  
Table 12 presents results where the independent pension variable measures pension value
rather than pension coverage.  Consistent with the specification of the dependent variables, in
columns 1 and 2 the independent variable is the total value of the pension.  In column 3 and 4, the
log of pension value is included as the independent variable measuring pension value.  The
independent variable in the regressions in column 5 and 6 is the ratio of the value of the pensions
to lifetime earnings.  There are a number of other differences between Tables 11 and 12.  Since
pension values are zero for individuals without a pension, the variable ln of pension value in
columns 3 and 4 is set equal to zero for those individuals, and a dummy variable indicating
pension coverage is added.  Therefore, the coefficients shown in columns 3 and 4 indicate only the39
marginal response of total wealth to an increase in pension value within the group of pension
covered workers.  Some of the regressions are redundant in that the coefficients in specifications
with total wealth, and total wealth less pensions as dependent variables differ by 1.0. 
Nevertheless, we maintain the same format as in Table 11 for comparability and because levels of
significance in the regressions of a measure of total wealth less pensions on pension value is of
interest in that they allow us to test whether the substitution of pensions for other wealth is
significant.
The linear specification in Table 12 suggests very little offset, and perhaps that higher
pensions induce an increase in other savings.  For example, the results in columns 1 and 2 of Table
12 suggest that the value of total wealth increases roughly by $1.11 for each additional dollar of
pension wealth, so that total nonpension wealth increases by 11 cents for every dollar held as
pension wealth.  This effect is significantly different from zero.  In the log specification, the
elasticity of total wealth with respect to pension wealth is about .2.  It rises to above .25 for those
in the top half of all earners.  Because the log specification standardizes for pension coverage, the
relation of pension wealth to total wealth or nonpension wealth reflects the relation only within
the group of pension covered workers.  This specification again suggests that increments in
pension value are associated with an increase in other wealth.  Specifically, each additional
hundred percent in pension value is associated with another 2 percent in nonpension wealth. 
The results in column 5 of Table 12 suggest a very high level of savings from increased
pension value.  These results suggest that an increase of 1.0 in the ratio of pension wealth to
lifetime earnings will result in an increase of 1.4 in the ratio of total wealth to lifetime earnings. 
Thus when we focus on pension values, and measure the variables in ratio form, the results54A finding of limited offset is consistent with augmented life cycle models that include
precautionary motivations for savings, such as Samwick (1994) and Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes
(1995).  But one would have expected to find that high earners have a greater tendency to offset
their pensions. 
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suggest that pensions are associated with an increase in other wealth accumulation.  
Comparing the median regressions with OLS regressions in Table 12, one again observes
large differences in the coefficients in the ratio specification, but smaller differences in the other
specifications.  Rather than suggesting that total wealth will differ by almost forty percent more
than pension wealth differs, as in the last two columns of row 1 in Table 12, the median
regressions suggest that total wealth will differ by 10 percent more than the difference in pension
wealth.  Robust regressions in the ratio format are roughly consistent with the median regressions. 
Results for high and low earners vary by specification and estimation method.  Sometimes,
implausibly, less offset is found for high earners than for low earners.
54  
Analysis of Substitution of Pension for Nonpension Wealth With Employees Only 
Examination of the descriptive statistics suggested the importance of real estate and
business wealth, and suggested that self employment may play an especially important role.  To
provide a more complete explanation than is provided by the dummy variable indicating self
employment that was included in each of the regressions reported above, we estimate the results
separately for employees only.  OLS results appear in Table 13.
If anything, the results for the pension coverage variable suggest even less substitution
between pensions and nonpension wealth within the population of employees than within the full
sample.  When the independent variable is pension value, there are mixed results between the55In an earlier study based on the HRS, which  used linked pension data from employers,
but computed social security wealth from self reported earnings histories (Gustman, Mitchell,
Samwick and Steinmeier, forthcoming), the ratio of pension and social security income to income
in retirement, or social security and pension wealth to total wealth in retirement, was similar to
values found by Grad (1994), Smith (1995), and Poterba, Venti and Wise (1994).
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specifications.  On balance, the finding that there is limited or no substitution of pension wealth
for nonpension wealth holds up when the regressions are run on a subsample consisting of
employees only.  
In sum, these findings suggest that if we have adequately controlled for heterogeneity,
then pensions increase total wealth.  In a few specifications, we find that half of the value of the
pension is reflected in the value of total assets held.  In most specifications, there is no
substitution of pension for nonpension wealth, and in some, pensions lead to an increase in
nonpension wealth.
A Comparison With Some Other Findings In The Literature
Many of the findings in this paper are unique, made possible by the availability of the
Health and Retirement Survey and the linkage of the respondent survey with employer provided
pension plan descriptions and social security earnings histories.  Thus many studies of wealth
ignore social security and pensions, including the value of pensions obtained on previous jobs but
not yet in pay status.  Other findings in this paper can be compared more directly with results
obtained by others in the literature.  Although we have discussed some of these findings when
discussing specific results, it is useful to provide a broad comparison of our findings with other
results in the literature.  
Our findings indicating widespread pension coverage among families are in accord with
Iams (1995).
55  Our finding that total wealth is proportionate to lifetime earnings is consistent42
with findings based on the HRS, but using self reported, rather than firm reported pension data as
reported in Venti and Wise (1998).  Our finding that social security is a poor investment for the
HRS cohort is consistent with findings by Leimer (1995).  However, others have a tendency to
understate the amount of redistribution fostered by social security.  Indeed, Steurele and Bakija
(1994) use a low real discount rate (2% real) to blow up the tax payments made by those who
were in the system in the 1980's and claim that, even today, most high earners who are on the
verge of retirement have received a large, positive transfer under the social security system.  As
we have seen, when the actual rates realized on government bonds are used to evaluate payroll
tax payments, the rate of return on social security taxes  on average is negative.  Our findings as
to the importance of income from business in the wealth distribution is consistent with Gentry and
Hubbard (1997).  Our finding of what appear to be close to adequate real replacement rates are
not consistent with Bernheim's (1993) conclusion, based on data for the baby boom cohort, of a
shortfall of two thirds in the savings rate; nor would we draw Mitchell and Moore's (forthcoming,
p. 44) conclusion, based on HRS data, that ".. the median American on the verge of retirement
has accumulated too little wealth to support a comfortable retirement".  Our findings, emphasizing
heterogeneity in the distribution of replacement rates, and our conclusion that most respondents
are adequately prepared for retirement, are consistent with Gale (1997).  On the other hand, we
find much less substitution of pensions for savings than Gale (1995) does.  The early literature on
pensions and savings (summarized in Munnell and Yohn, 1992) found little evidence that other
forms of wealth were offset by pensions.  However, Gale concludes that this literature was
incorrect, and that revising the specification of the wealth equation suggests much greater offset. 
Consistent with the earlier literature, our results suggest there is little offset between pensions and43
nonpension wealth, so that pensions add to total wealth by a good deal more than half the value of
the pension.  This result is difficult to reconcile with the widely accepted idea that a fundamental
motivation for pensions is to shield retirement savings from taxes (Ippolito, 1984; Woodbury and
Huang, 1991).  
Conclusions and Implications for Public Policy:  
A number of issues of interest to policy makers have been addressed in this paper:
What fraction of households are covered by pensions?
Three fourths of households have ever been covered by a pension and two thirds are
receiving or are entitled to benefits from a pension.  Only half of the individuals in the HRS are
covered by a pension.  This contrast between individual and household coverage by pensions is
extremely important.  Together with estimates of pension value for households with pensions, it
suggests that the leg of the retirement stool represented by pensions is solidly supporting a large
majority of households approaching retirement.  This finding makes it harder to argue for
aggressive expansion of the pension system.   Because pensions are not redistributive unless they
are retargetted toward those in the bottom of the earnings distribution, they are difficult to justify
as a mechanism for helping poor households in their retirement.  Social security
disproportionately benefits low income families, while pensions benefit middle and higher income
families.
What do pensions from current and past jobs contribute to the retirement savings of families who
are approaching retirement age?  
Fifty eight percent of pension wealth is represented by the pension held in the current job. 
Because the HRS population is 51 to 61, and some have begun the transition into retirement, 4244
percent of pension wealth comes from pensions earned on the last or previous job.
What is the value of pensions lost by pension covered workers leaving their jobs?
Not counting losses from backloading of pensions when workers leave before qualifying
for early retirement, less than ten percent of the current value of pensions has been lost by HRS
respondents as a direct result of having left a pension covered job.  Two thirds of households have
a current pension that is paying or will pay them benefits, while three quarters of households
report they were ever covered by a pension.  With a total of $74,461 in expected pension value
per individual in the HRS from current, last and previous jobs, there is an additional $9,214, or
12.4 percent in value originating in pensions, that no longer is held in a pension.  Of that amount,
7.9 percent was cashed out.  To the extent that any cash settlements were saved, that sum might
still be received in some form during retirement.   Another 2.8 percent was rolled over into
another pension or IRA vehicle.  An additional 1.7 percent would have been received had it not
been lost.   Was social security a good deal for families in the HRS cohort?  
Social security has not been a good deal on average for members of the HRS cohort. 
Using SSA assumptions, at retirement age, the present value of benefits will fall below the present
value of taxes paid by about ten percent.
How much wealth are HRS households accumulating as they approach retirement?
On average each household in the HRS has accumulated about half a million dollars.  In
1992 HRS respondents were about seven years away from retirement.  Including all assets and the
expected value of social security and pension payments, accumulated wealth averages about 39
percent of lifetime earnings for the full sample, and about 40 percent of lifetime earnings for the
median ten percent of households.  45
Does wealth vary importantly with lifetime earnings?  
  The highest ratios of wealth to lifetime earnings are found for those with low levels of
lifetime earnings, perhaps reflecting a real phenomenon, or alternatively a reporting effect.  From
the 10th decile of lifetime earners on up the lifetime earnings distribution to the 95th percentile,
the ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings is relatively steady.  Social security accounts for a large
share of the wealth held by households with a history of low earnings.  Pensions are most
important to middle class households and many households with high earners.  If we are to
understand savings and wealth in the U.S., and the behavior underlying savings and wealth
accumulation, pensions and social security must be included in studies of wealth and savings.  
Are family resources adequate to support a reasonable standard of living in retirement?  
The distributions of real and nominal replacement rates indicate that those with the lowest
quarter of replacement rates will not be replacing a large share of their final earnings in retirement. 
Ordering households by their replacement rates, those at the twenty fifth percentile will be able to
replace half of final earnings on a nominal basis, and only a third of final earnings on a real basis. 
The median replacement rates, from assets accrued about seven years before retirement, are 79
percent on a nominal basis and 52 percent on a real basis.  Adding in the accrual of pensions and
interest from 1992 until retirement and assuming additional savings over the years until retirement
equal to one half year's income would raise replacement rates by about a fifth.  Eliminating
housing wealth from the base would create a downward adjustment in the replacement rates by
about 16 percent of their current value.  The distribution of wealth is skewed even within
relatively narrow earnings brackets, so that average replacement rates are higher than median
replacement rates. 46
Whether these replacement rates are considered adequate depends mainly on the standard
against which they are judged.  If the standard is based on average income earned over the
worklife, and if adjustments are made for expenses on children, taxes, work related and other
expenses, and for the reduction in savings once one retires, then current assets will prove to be
adequate for most retirees in this cohort.
Are those with pensions better prepared for retirement? 
The answer to this question depends on what part of the distribution you are talking
about.  At the means, those without pensions are better prepared for retirement than are those
with pensions.  Thus the wealth-lifetime earnings ratio for those with pensions is 38.1 percent,
while the comparable ratio is 42.6 percent for those without pensions.  But there is a great deal of
heterogeneity affecting the wealth-lifetime earnings ratios.  As a result, median replacement rates
at retirement among those with pensions are higher than  the comparable medians for those
without pensions.   Among those with pensions, the median value of the nominal replacement rate
is .85.  At the 50th percentile of the replacement rate distribution for those without a pension, the
nominal replacement rate is .61.  Those with pensions fare much better in the bottom part of the
distribution; at the 10th percentile of replacement rates for those with a pension, the replacement
rate is .41, while it is .20 at the 10th percentile of the distribution of those without a pension.  On
the other hand, at the 90th percentile of the replacement rate distribution for those with a pension,
the replacement rate is 1.8, while at the comparable percentile of the replacement rate distribution
for those without a pension, the replacement rate is 2.6.
Are those without pensions saving adequately for retirement?
Again the answer varies among the heterogeneous population.  The one quarter of the47
population never covered by a pension is divided into various groups, including one group with
very low wealth and low lifetime earnings, and another group with very high wealth from business
and real estate. Employees without pensions have much lower replacement rates than self
employed without pensions.
 Is there a crisis in retirement savings?  
If the standard for an adequate replacement rate is based on average income adjusted for
the presence of children, taxes, work related expenses and other factors, then in view of the
replacement rates we have found for the HRS population, it is very difficult to discern the kind of
crisis in retirement savings that has been the focus of articles in the media, and some studies that
focus only on the gap in financial assets.  Although even under these criteria, some are clearly
undersaving, many are on an appropriate path, saving adequately for retirement.  Because social
security is essentially pay-as-you-go, and it represents such a large fraction of retirement savings,
the statement that households are accumulating assets that are roughly sufficient to finance
retirement does not, of course, imply that the savings rate in the U.S. is adequate.  Nor will
replacement rates remain adequate if there are very large reductions in social security benefits.
Is there a great deal of substitution between pensions and other components of retirement
savings?
Can we believe simple statistical findings suggesting that pensions do not increase wealth
accumulation for retirement? The ratio of wealth to lifetime earnings is higher for those without
pensions than for those with pensions.  Pensions are worth 30 percent of total wealth for those
who ever had a pension.  Those without pensions hold 36 percent of their total wealth in the form
of real estate and business assets.  Those with pensions hold 13 percent of their assets in the form48
of real estate and business assets.  The additional 23 percent of total wealth holdings represented
by real estate and business assets held by those without pensions almost makes up for the share of
assets represented by pensions.  But this result is driven by the households without pensions who
have high wealth, often due to self employment.  Thus heterogeneity between the populations
with and without pensions clouds any simple comparison aimed at discovering the effects of
pensions on wealth.
Do reduced form multivariate analyses indicate that pensions are associated with higher
wealth accumulation?  If we have controlled adequately for the differences between those without
pensions and those with pensions, then our findings suggest that pensions increase wealth.  Total
wealth is raised for those with pensions by at least half the value of the pension and probably by a
good deal more.  Indeed, in some specifications these results suggest there may be no substitution
of pensions for other assets, and that it is even possible that pensions induce an increase in the
holding of other assets, adding to total wealth by more than the value of the pension.  
Overall, these results suggest that pensions do improve preparation for retirement and that
policies that encourage pensions will increase overall savings.  The finding that the wealth
earnings ratio is roughly constant throughout the earnings distribution would be consistent with
the predictions of a simple life cycle model.  However, the finding of little or no pension offset
raises doubts about a simple life cycle explanation for wealth accumulation.  In addition the
finding of little or no pension offset raises doubts about one of the leading explanations for
pensions, that they are heavily demanded as a simple tax avoidance device where tax favored
pension savings substitute for nonpension savings.  
The Health and Retirement Study is a rich source of information for understanding wealth49
accumulation.  Much more work will have to be done before we are in a position to explain all of
the relationships exhibited by this data set.  Yet it is encouraging to know that these data provide
a wonderful opportunity for researchers who are interested in explaining not only the relation of
wealth to pensions, and more broadly saving for retirement, but also the joint determination of
retirement and savings.
The data do not support the most dire views of retirement prospects, at least not for those
now on the verge of retirement.  Pensions are doing a better job providing support for households
than they are given credit for.  To the extent that this cohort will not experience large cuts in
social security, its members have less to fear from the imbalances in the system.  With the cohort
benefiting from wide pension coverage of its households, it is clear that a large majority of
households have been exposed to information on retirement.  Nevertheless, if the finding that
pensions are not offset by declines in other savings continues to hold, it suggests that creating
privatized social security accounts, or increasing pension coverage, could have additional, positive
effects on savings beyond those incorporated in most analyses.50
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Table 1: Pension Values From Current, Past and Previous Jobs Among Individuals And












Current Job 12,557 43,450 35.2 123,424 58,756
Last Job 12,557 13,474 7.5 179,742 116,997
Previous Jobs 12,557 17,537 12.0 145,884 69,365
Total Pension 12,557 74,461 50.0 148,884 78,892
All Households
Current Job 7,607 72,777 48.6 149,817 76,664
Last Job 7,607 22,779 11.8 193,663 127,911
Previous Jobs 7,607 29,434 19.2 153,400 74,563
Total Pension 7,607 124,991 65.6 190,621 112,499
Source: Calculations from employer provided pension plan descriptions from the Health and
Retirement Study.  Defined benefit pension values are projected to early retirement age and
prorated to 1992.  All values are weighted by survey weights.  Pension values are imputed for
those respondents without a matched pension plan.  Individuals are those within the HRS age
range.  Current, last and previous jobs correspond to jobs in Sections F, G and H of HRS Wave 1. 
Last job is the most recent job held by those who are currently not working.  Previous job is the
job of at least five years duration held before either the current job, for those who are working, or
the last job for those who are not, and all earlier jobs that offered a pension.55
 Table 2: Pension Values Among Individuals And Households  In The HRS By Gender And










All Individuals 12,557 74,461 50.0 148,884 78,892
All Men 5,849 123,966 62.8 197,354 123,361
All Women 6,708 31,193 38.8 80,345 42,050
Married Men 5,108 126,766 64.2 197,305 125,486
Married Women 5,076 28,029 37.3 75,230 39,723
Single Men 741 105,565 53.4 197,744 107,842
Single Women 1,632 40,887 43.6 93,731 50,145
All Households 7,607 124,991 65.6 190,621 112,499
Married
Households
5,234 154,512 74.3 207,868 129,935
Source: See Table 1.56
Table 3: Disposition Of All Pensions From Last And Previous Jobs









Expect Future Benefit 6,786 7.7 87,826
Receive Current Benefit 23,663 10.8 218,906
Received Cash Settlement 5,850 9.4 61,946
Rolled Pension Over 2,070 1.8 115,405
Lost Benefit 1,294 3.0 42,579
Source: Authors' calculations for the 1992 wave of the Health and Retirement Study, including
employer provided pension plan descriptions.  57
Table 4: Present Value Calculations For HRS Households of Social Security Benefits To Be
Received As Of Expected Retirement Date And Present Value of Taxes Paid
PV Benefits PV Payroll Taxes PV Benefits/
PV Taxes
Benefits Discounted With





SSA Interest Rate And
Taxes Inflated By 10 Year
Government Bond Rate
120,279 133,739 0.899
All values are discounted to 1992.  Source: Authors' calculations for the 1992 wave of the Health
and Retirement Study, including respondents' earnings social security earnings histories.  58
Table 5: Components Of Mean Wealth And Wealth For Median Ten Percent of Wealth Holding
Households: HRS 1($1992)
Source of Wealth
Mean Mean For The Median












Total 491,821 100.0 335,009 100.0
House Value 78,826 16.0 63,389 18.9
Real Estate 39,227 8.0 9,484 2.8
Business Assets 39,724 8.1 6,776 2.0
Financial Assets 42,140 8.6 19,687 5.9
IRA Assets 19,613 4.0 10,259 3.1
Social Security 116,455 23.7 128,084 38.2
Pension Value 124,991 25.4 73,571 22.0
  Male 97,031 19.7 51,352 15.3
  Female 27,960 5.7 22,219 6.6
Retiree Health Insurance  8,461 1.7 9,122 2.7
  Male 5,887 1.1 6,015 1.8
  Female 2,574 0.5 3,107 0.9
Other 22,383 4.6 14,638 4.4
Observations 7,607 7,607
Source: Authors' calculations using HRS Wave 1.  Net wealth is defined as net worth, assets less
liabilities.  Pension value is based on SPD data, and is calculated by prorating projected pension
values obtained from employer-provided plan descriptions for DB plans and contributions for DC
plans.  Median ten percent of households are those with net wealth in the forty fifth to fifty fifth
percentiles.  All data are weighted by HRS sample weights.  59
Table 6: Lifetime Earnings, Wealth, Replacement Rates And Related Measures By Lifetime Earnings Percentile, All Households
Lifetime Earnings Percentile-All Households
0-5 5-10 10- 25 25-50 50-75 75-90 90-95 95-100 45-55 All
Average Pension
Wealth, All Workers
1,018 7,002 21,668 70,140 138,436 216,857 289,104 443,382 93,930 124,991
Pension Wealth/Total
Wealth (Average)
0.02 0.05 0.12 0.20 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.21 0.25
Average Lifetime
Earnings
27,273 144,854 392,781 844,443 1,345,378 1,886,986 2,470,710 5,048,032 1,098,095 1,273,960
Average Wealth 63,434 134,055 175,407 346,908 522,458 734,336 950,167 1,610,692 439,020 491,821
Median Lifetime
Earnings
21,895 142,356 393,063 841,050 1,333,091 1,857,585 2,438,203 3,543,256 1,099,704 1,099,704
Median Wealth 13,796 55,844 115,087 257,649 437,430 643,837 796,993 1,215,394 339,869 333,723
Wealth/Lifetime
Earnings (Average)
2.33 0.93 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.32 0.40 0.39
Wealth/Lifetime
Earnings (Median)
0.63 0.39 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.30
Replacement Rates, All
Workers (Nominal)
1.23 1.19 0.83 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.6 0.97 0.86
Replacement Rates, All
Workers (Real)
0.89 0.86 0.59 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.41 0.66 0.60
Source: Authors' calculations for the 1992 wave of the Health and Retirement Study.  The bottom two rows of this table report the annuitized value
of wealth accumulated through 1992, not through the age of retirement.60
Table 7: Distribution of Nominal and Real Replacement Rates From a Two Thirds Joint and
Survivors Annuity Relative To Final Earnings








0.04 0.15 0.21 0.33 0.52 0.81 1.32 1.93 5.71
Source: Authors' calculations for the 1992 wave of the Health and Retirement Study.  This table
annuitizes wealth accumulated through 1992, not through the age of retirement.61

























Source: Authors' calculations for the 1992 wave of the Health and Retirement Study. 
Regressions are not weighted.  Wealth includes the prorated value of pensions accrued to date
and the accrued value of social security.  Wealth does not include potential wealth from human
capital.  Figures reported are coefficients, t-statistics and adjusted or pseudo R
2.  62
Table 9: Components Of Mean Wealth And Wealth For Median Ten Percent of Wealth Holding
Households By Pension Status: HRS 1($1992)
Source of Wealth
Mean Mean For The Median













Total  555,644 100.0 406,259 100.0
Social Security 130,216 23.4 137,324 33.8
Pension Value 164,386 29.6 108,086 26.6
House Value 85,983 15.5 77,387 19.0
Real Estate 37,615 6.8 12,427 3.1
Business Wealth 33,645 6.1 5,540 1.4
Financial Wealth 46,616 8.4 23,486 5.8
IRA Assets 22,720 4.1 12,969 3.2
Other 34,462 6.2 29,039 7.1
Observations 5,641 5,641
Households Without Pensions
Total  289,328 100.0 106,345 100.0
Social Security 72,796 25.2 78,215 73.5
Pension Value 0 0.0 0 0.0
House Value 56,120 19.4 16,033 15.1
Real Estate 44,341 15.3 1,468 1.4
Business Wealth 59,009 20.4 504 0.5
Financial Wealth 27,938 9.7 1,624 1.5
IRA Assets 9,758 3.4 1,278 1.2
Other 19,365 6.7 7,224 6.8
Observations 1,966 1,966
Source: See Table 5 63
Table 10: Ratio Of Total Wealth To Lifetime Earnings, By Lifetime Earnings Category, Ever Covered By A Pension And Self Employment Status
Lifetime Earnings Percentile
0-5 5-10 10- 25 25-50 50-75 75-90 90-95 95-100 45-55 All
All Households 2.326 0.925 0.447 0.411 0.388 0.389 0.385 0.319 0.400 0.386
  All Employees 2.229 0.806 0.412 0.362 0.370 0.375 0.353 0.308 0.361 0.368
  All Self Employed 3.189 1.689 0.664 0.651 0.519 0.482 0.530 0.331 0.593 0.454
All Pension Covered 1.822 1.085 0.495 0.408 0.385 0.389 0.374 0.321 0.398 0.381
  Employees w/ Pension 1.822 1.104 0.474 0.381 0.373 0.379 0.356 0.311 0.373 0.372
  Self Emp w/ Pension * 0.590 0.693 0.637 0.505 0.480 0.508 0.333 0.598 0.426
All Without Pension 2.387 0.858 0.381 0.422 0.431 0.396 0.484 0.306 0.409 0.423
  Employees w/o Pension 2.285 0.659 0.318 0.237 0.283 0.236 0.249 0.255 0.197 0.320
  Self Emp w/o Pension 3.189 1.789 0.645 0.667 0.543 0.487 0.560 0.321 0.587 0.515
Source: See Table 5.64
Table 11: Comparing Coefficients On Pension Coverage Between Regressions With Total Assets,
and Total Assets Less Pension Wealth  As Dependent Variables































































































































Table 11 (continued): Comparing Coefficients On Pension Coverage Between Regressions With
Total Assets, and Total Assets Less Pension Wealth  As Dependent Variables















































































Source: Authors' calculations for the 1992 wave of the Health and Retirement Study. 
Regressions are unweighted.  Wealth includes the prorated pensions accrued to date and the
accrued value of social security.  Observations with negative wealth are excluded from the
regressions in column 3 and 4.  Wealth does not include potential wealth from human capital. 
Figures reported are coefficients, and t-statistics.  Independent variables include lifetime earnings
(or its log, in columns 3-6), indicators  of whether the household is headed by a single male or
female, and the male's share of household earnings.  For the person with the highest lifetime
earnings, we include age, retirement horizon, veteran's status, health, work in manufacturing,
public employment, work in management, professional, white collar, self employment, firm size
and union status.  Independent variables for the household also include indicators  of race
reported as Black or Hispanic, whether there are children in the household and whether they live
home, whether there is a child in college, indicators of highest level of schooling in the household,
and whether anyone in the household reports themselves to be in fair or poor health.  Linear
regressions include earnings as an additional independent variable, and regressions for the ratio of
wealth to earnings and ln wealth also include the ln of earnings as an independent variable.   66
Table 12: Comparing Coefficients On Pension Value Variable Between Regressions With Total























































































































Table 12 (continued): Comparing Coefficients On Pension Value Variable Between Regressions










































































Source: See Table 11.  The independent pension variable is the value of the pension in columns 1
and 2.  In columns 3 and 4, the independent variable is log of pension value.  The log regression
includes a dummy variable indicating if the value of the pension is zero.  In the log specification,
observations with negative total wealth values are excluded.  In columns 5 and 6 the independent
variable is the ratio of pension wealth to lifetime earnings.  68























































































































Source: See Tables 11 and 12.  69
Appendix Table
Table A1: Replacement Rates, Real Annuity By Lifetime Earnings and Wealth
Lifetime Wealth Brackets
Earnings 0-5 5-10 10-25 25-50 50-75 75-90 90-95 95-100 45-55 All
Brackets
0-5 0.11 0.73 0.75 3.75 5.84 10.43 0.72 1.19 3.82 0.87
5-10 0.16 0.32 0.62 1.21 3.16 3.74 4.14 13.96 1.47 0.83
10-25 -0.20 0.22 0.37 0.66 1.13 0.99 2.88 6.82 0.88 0.60
25-50 0.06 0.21 0.28 0.46 0.78 1.03 2.06 2.59 0.66 0.66
50-75 -0.13 0.07 0.24 0.36 0.58 0.84 1.32 2.48 0.45 0.65
75-90 -0.02 0.09 0.10 0.28 0.45 0.65 0.87 1.88 0.35 0.65
90-95 * * 0.15 0.23 0.37 0.55 0.75 1.50 0.29 0.68
95-100 * * 0.07 0.08 0.29 0.38 0.16 0.70 0.18 0.41
45-55 -0.23 0.04 0.23 0.40 0.67 1.06 1.91 2.62 0.57 0.67
All 0.05 0.26 0.32 0.40 0.57 0.69 0.49 1.08 0.50 0.60
*No observations.